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INTRODUCTION

Governments are principally responsible for the implementation of
human rights law and humanitarian law during periods of international
armed conflict.' During periods of noninternational armed conflict, governments and armed opposition groups each bear responsibility for their
obedience to human rights law and humanitarian law.2
International human rights organizations can only encourage participants in armed conflicts to respect human rights law and humanitarian
law. Several human rights organizations have attempted to do so. For
many years the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has
taken a leading role in encouraging the application of humanitarian law
during periods of international armed conflict; recently it has also begun
referring to human rights law in situations of domestic strife or tension
that international humanitarian law does not cover.3
1. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force
March 23, 1976, art. 2, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N.
Doc. A/6316 (1967) [hereinafter International Covenant]; common article 1 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3114, T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S.
No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S.
No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
for the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] [hereinafter collectively the Geneva Conventions].
The Geneva Conventions also recognize that governments which are not parties to the
conflict may serve as protecting powers, but such status is rarely, if ever, granted in
practice. E. ROSENBLAD, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
15-17 (1977); 2 H. LEviE, THE CODE OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 577-605
(1986). Article 90 of Additional Protocol I also envisages the appointment of an International Fact-finding Commission consisting of fifteen impartial persons of high moral
standing, but this provision has not been used yet. See E. ROSENBLAD, supra, at 18.
2. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions, supra note 1, common art. 3.
3. First, Second, and Third Geneva Conventions, supra note 1, common art. 9;
Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 10; Geneva Conventions, supra note 1,
common art. 3;
AND HUMAN

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, THE RED CROSS

RIGHTS

38-39 (1983) [hereinafter ICRC,

HUMAN

RIGHTS];

Schindler,
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Intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations General
Assembly (General Assembly),4 the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, 5 the International Court of Justice,6 the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights7 and several others have occasionally attempted to use their influence to seek the protection of human rights law
during armed conflicts, and they have referred irregularly to humanitarian law in such endeavors." These intergovernmental organizations have

The InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross and Human Rights, 19 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 3 (1979).
4. See G.A. Res. 2675, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) at 76, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970); see also United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. ST/
HR/2, at 110-16 (1973).
5. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Afghanistan devoted significant attention to the armed conflict in that nation and the applicable humanitarian norms. 41 U.N. ESCOR (agenda item 12), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/21, at 2832, 42-45, 47-48 (1985). The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in
El Salvador identified the applicable international humanitarian standards in common
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions [hereinafter common article 3] and Additional Protocol II, but did not use these standards in assessing the facts collected. 41 U.N. ESCOR
(prov. agenda item 12), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/18, at 37-45 (1985); U.N. Doc. A/
39/636, at 28-34 (1984). In contrast, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human
Rights in Guatemala not only experienced difficulty in establishing relevant facts, but
also failed to apply humanitarian law or any other specific human rights provisions. 41
U.N. ESCOR (agenda item 12), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/19 (1985). See generally the
written statement submitted by Human Rights Advocates, Inc., a nongovernmental organization in consultative status, 42 U.N. ESCOR (agenda item 12), U.N. Doc. EL/
CN.4/1986/NGO/46 (1986).
6. See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nic. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 113-15, 129-30 (June 27, 1986); reprinted in 25
I.L.M. 1023, 1073-74, 1081 (1986).
7. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights generally relies on the provisions of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American
Convention on Human Rights for its operative human rights standards, but it has found
violations of common article 3. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,
Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Republic of Guatemala, OAS Doc.
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, doc. 47, rev. 1, at 69-70 (1983). See also Application 9213 (Disabled Peoples' International v. United States), Inter-Am. C.H.R. 184 OEA/SER.L/L/
V/II.71, doc. 9, rev. 1 (1987) (citing common article 3) [hereinafter DPI v. U.S.]; id.
(declaring admissible a complaint on behalf of sixteen persons who were killed and six
who were injured when United States military aircraft mistakenly bombed the Richmond
Hill Insane Asylum in Grenada, West Indies).
8. See generally Ramcharan, The Role of InternationalBodies in the Implementation and Enforcement of HumanitarianLaw and Human Rights Law in Noninternational Armed Conflicts, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 99 (1983); Wolf, L'Oit et la Croix-Rouge Convergences de leur action, in STUDIES AND ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND RED CROSS PRINCIPLES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET 1011

(C.
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attempted to fill the vacuum left by the failure of the United Nations
Security Council and other international mechanisms to cope successfully
with violations of human rights law during periods of armed conflict.
International nongovernmental organizations" such as Americas
Watch, Amnesty International, International Alert, the International Association of Democratic Lawyers, the International Commission of Jurists, the International Federation of Human Rights, the International
League for Human Rights, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights,
and the Minority Rights Group have also recognized that human rights
need protection during periods of armed conflict. 1" In addressing human
rights violations, these organizations and the United Nations have relied
principally on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights"1 and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.1 2 These organizations have begun to refer more frequently, however, to principles of humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict, such as the principles in the
four Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 (Geneva Conventions) and
the two Additional Protocols of June 8, 1977 (Additional Protocols I and
II or Additional Protocols).1 3

Swinarski ed. 1984) [hereinafter

STUDIES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PIGTET]. For a review
of historical efforts to implement the Hague Regulations through international adjudica-

tion, see Gross, New Rules and Institutionsfor the Peaceful Settlement of International
Disputes, 76 PROC. AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. 131 (1982).
9. See Weissbrodt, The Contribution of InternationalNongovernmental Organizations to the Protection of Human Rights, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
403 (T. Meron ed. 1984); id. at 436-38 (for bibliography); Shestack, Sisyphus
ScH. L. REV. 89 (1978).
10. Serious human rights violations including arbitrary killings, detentions, and illtreatment are likely to increase in times of armed conflict. Amnesty International, in its
Annual Report of 1986, identified twenty-one countries in which human rights issues
arose during periods of armed conflict: Afghanistan, Angola, Botswana (South African
attacks), Burma, Chad, Colombia, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Honduras (Nicaraguan armed opposition groups), Israeli Occupied Territories, Kampuchea, Lebanon,
Lesotho (South African attacks), Mozambique, Namibia, the Philippines, Somalia, the
Sudan, Uganda, and Vietnam. The Annual Report also noted Amnesty International's
concern about prisoners held by the Polisario Front and thus tangentially mentioned the
conflict in Morocco and the Western Sahara. The report failed to mention the war beLAW

Endures: The InternationalHuman Rights NGO, 24 N.Y.L.

tween Iran and Iraq. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL
REPORT 1986 (1986) [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 1986].
11. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
12. See supra note 1.
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), opened for signature December 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144, Annex I, reprinted in 16 I.L.M.
1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
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This Article will first review how nongovernmental organizations attempt to apply human rights law and humanitarian law during periods
of armed conflict. It will next review the practice of one principal intergovernmental organization-the United Nations General Assembly-in
citing humanitarian law. Third, this Article will study the reasons why
the United Nations and international nongovernmental organizations
should or should not refer to humanitarian law in support of their
human rights work. Fourth, it will consider the preeminent position in
implementing international humanitarian law of the ICRC, a private
Swiss organization engaged in various international activities including
specific functions provided by international humanitarian law. This Article will then consider the role that other-principally nongovernmental-organizations can play in situations of armed conflict. Sixth, it will
examine factors affecting fact-finding in periods of armed conflict. Finally, this Article will discuss the effectiveness of nongovernmental organizations in preventing human rights violations during periods of armed
conflict.
II.

PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS IN REFERRING TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
STANDARDS

Considerable diversity exists in the way nongovernmental organizations use humanitarian law in their human rights work and in how they
approach armed conflict situations. Indeed, even with regard to individual nongovernmental organizations, one can identify varying policies and
practices. Different individual authors, a failure to develop consistent supervision over the content of reports, and the slow learning process in
recognizing the importance of humanitarian law might explain why a
single organization would use diverse approaches in its various reports.
A.

Reports Issued by Americas Watch

Americas Watch has issued a series of semi-annual reports on human
rights in El Salvador. The report dated January 31, 1984, is typical: it
presented facts but failed to assess them under international legal principles, and it included no citations whatsoever to humanitarian law.14 The

12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Noninternational Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), opened for signature December 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144,
Annex II, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1442 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol II].
14. AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE & THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION,
As BAD AS EVER: A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR (Supp. 1984). One
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report dated August 1984 revealed a slight change: it reproduced the
provisions of Additional Protocol II and referred by analogy to the provisions of Additional Protocol I when discussing the indiscriminate attacks
on civilians. 1" The August 1984 report made relatively little effort to
apply these provisions to the facts, however, and in all other respects it
simply set forth the facts without applying any international legal norms.
The Americas Watch report entitled Violations of the Laws of War by
Both Sides in Nicaragua 1981-1985 (Nicaragua Report) established a
complete legal framework for the application of common article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions (common article 3), Additional Protocol II and customary international law.1 The Nicaragua Report considered with precision the facts that determined how humanitarian law should characterize armed conflicts in and near the frontiers of Nicaragua. Having
initially established the framework for applying humanitarian law, however, the Nicaragua Report did not carry its analysis through completely
by applying the substantive norms to the facts developed in the latter
part of the report.
The Americas Watch report on Colombia (Colombia Report) used a
different approach to humanitarian law issues.1 The Colombia Report
set forth the facts without using legal principles to assess whether human
rights violations had occurred. An appendix to the Colombia Report,
however, began with the observation that Americas Watch had been reporting violations of humanitarian law in countries with internal armed
finds a similar approach in AMERICAS

WATCH COMMITTEE, ABDICATING DEMOCRATIC

AUTHORITY: HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERU

15.

AMERICAS WATCH & LAWYERS

(1984).
COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMAN

A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR 42-46 (Supp.
1984). Similarly, the third supplement makes a very brief reference to common article 3,
while the sixth supplement cites two provisions of Additional Protocol II. AMERICAS
RIGHTS, FREE FIRE:

WATCH COMMITTEE & THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, THIRD SUPPLEMENT

TO THE REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR 59
WATCH, DRAINING THE SEA ...

(Supp. 1983);

AMERICAS

SIXTH SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT ON HUMAN

(Supp. 1985). See also AMERICAS WATCH, THE CIVIL1986-1987: NINTH SUPPLEMENT TO THE REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EL SALVADOR 60 (Supp. 1987) (citing article 3 of Protocol II Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949) [hereinafter THE CIVILIAN TOLL]; AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN
RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA: No NEUTRALS ALLOWED 70-100 (1982) (setting forth the
facts without analyzing in depth the applicable legal norms, except in a chapter on the
constitution, where the report relies principally on the American Convention on Human
Rights and gives some consideration to common article 3).
16. AMERICAS WATCH, VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS OF WAR BY BOTH SIDES IN
NICARAGUA 1981-1985, at 11-34, 96-98 (1985).
17. AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN COLOMBIA, As PRESIDENT BARCO BEGINS (1986).
RIGHTS IN EL SALVADOR 62-63
IAN TOLL
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conflicts. The report gave two reasons for this reliance on humanitarian
law: first, humanitarian law, unlike human rights law, binds both governmental and nongovernmental parties to armed conflicts, thereby providing a legal framework for assessing abuses by all parties; and second,
human rights law is designed to operate in times of peace while humanitarian law governs the conduct of military operations...
The appendix to the Colombia Report is not as thorough and scholarly in its establishment of a framework for the application of humanitarian law as the Nicaragua Report. The Colombia report is relatively
simplistic in that it did not analyze the armed conflict sufficiently to determine if common article 3 applied, although its appendix applied the
provisions of common article 3 to the facts developed in the body of the
report. Nevertheless, the Colombia Report's relatively simplistic reliance
on common article 3 may have been appropriate to the armed conflict in
Colombia and may have been necessary to keep the attention of the nontechnical audience Americas Watch wanted to address. Moreover, because the appendix applied humanitarian law norms to the facts, the
Colombia Report is more successful than the Nicaragua Report. In both
reports, however, Americas Watch nearly ignored international human
rights law and preferred to use humanitarian law, apparently believing
humanitarian law would be more influential with United States public
opinion-the principal audience Americas Watch strives to reach.
B.

Reports Issued by Amnesty International

Amnesty International has sporadically made use of humanitarian law
in dealing with torture, the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience, executions, and unfair trials in political cases arising during periods of
armed conflict. Yet the limited mandate of Amnesty International-to
work for the freedom of prisoners of conscience and for fair trials in
18. Id. at 57. This observation overstates the case in that human rights law does
contain nonderogable rights that apply even in periods of armed conflict. See, e.g., International Covenant, supra note 1, art. 4. Although the report is correct in stating that
human rights law is directed principally at governments, human rights law does contain
norms applicable to "every individual and every organ of society." See, e.g, Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 1, preambular para. 8; International Covenant, supra note 1, preambular para. 5; Daes, The Individual's Duties to the Community and the Limitations on Human Rights and Freedoms Under Article 29 of the
Universal Declarationof Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/432/Rev.2, at 50
(1983). The observation also overstates the previous practice of Americas Watch in using
humanitarian law. Nevertheless, this 1986 pronouncement by Americas Watch represents a considerable development in the thinking process of that organization concerning
the application of humanitarian law.
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political cases-does not fit easily within the legal structure of humanitarian law. Nevertheless, within the last few years Amnesty International's
efforts during periods of armed conflict have improved significantly and
become more sophisticated, although its practices are still not entirely
consistent.19
Amnesty International's 1977 report on human rights violations in
Ethiopia cited both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. It concluded: "The practice of the security forces in taking hostages and committing murder against civilians in the areas of armed conflict is contrary
to Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 194 9."'0 The
1978 Amnesty International report on Ethiopia (Ethiopia Report) discussed the armed struggle in Eritrea, the Ogaden (against Somalia), and
several other regions. Several errors are apparent, however, in the Ethiopia Report's analysis: it mistakenly relied on the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights; it erroneously referred to the United Nations Charter
as protecting the rights to life, freedom from torture, and a fair trial; and
it omitted any reference to humanitarian law.21 Amnesty International
has made similar errors in more recent reports. An Amnesty International memorandum on Ethiopia in 1986 again discussed the conflict between government forces and opposition groups "which claim to have
substantial armed forces and to control territory," but it referred to the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights, and the Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, without
citing principles of humanitarian law.2 2

19.
VADOR

See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN EL SAL45 (1984) (Al Index: AMR 29/14/84) (citing common article 3); AMNESTY IN-

TERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ETHIOPIA

25/07/77);

26 (1977) (AI Index: AFR

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ETHIOPIA

16 (1978) (AI Index: AFR 25/10/78);

15-

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ETHIOPIA: POLITI-

CAL IMPRISONMENT AND TORTURE 2, 18 (1986) (AI Index: AFR 25/09/86); AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO,

10-13 February 1981 (1982); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL USA,
(1986); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNA-

TORTURE IN MOROCCO 10

TIONAL'S CURRENT CONCERNS IN EL SALVADOR

20. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 19, at 26.
21. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
supra note 19, at 15-16.
22. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
TURE, supra note 19, at 2, 18.

2 (1985) (AI Index: AMR 29/09/85).

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ETHIOPIA

(1977),

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ETHIOPIA

(1978),

ETHIOPIA: POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT AND TOR-
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Amnesty International's report of a mission to Morocco in 1981 did
not deal with human rights violations arising during the armed conflict
in the Western Sahara, although Amnesty International did raise with
the Moroccan authorities the issue of individuals who had "disappeared"
from uncontested Moroccan territory-including some who had "disappeared" in the context of the war in the Western Sahara. 3 Similarly, in
its January 1986 report on torture in Morocco, Amnesty International
acknowledged the continuing armed conflict in the Western Sahara, but
failed to deal with related human rights violations. 4
Amnesty International's open letter of 1981 to the United States Secretary of State in relation to military assistance to the Government of El
Salvador referred briefly to the Salvadoran Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights. The
letter stated that while Amnesty International knew the human rights
violations in question occurred during a period of internal armed conflict, the human rights instruments referred to above all prohibit derogation of the rights to freedom from arbitrary deprivation of life, torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. The letter went on to observe that those same actions violate common article 3, and it proceeded
to quote from common article 3 at some length.2 5
In a memorandum of June 1985, Amnesty International cited only the
relevant provisions of common article 3 as a basis for its condemnation of
extrajudicial executions in El Salvador.2 6 After sending a mission to
Guatemala in 1985, Amnesty International noted that while the Guatemalan armed forces were familiar with the standards in common article
3, the Guatemalan officers were unfamiliar with the relevant provisions
of the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials
and article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.17 Amnesty International recommended that members of the mili-

23.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,

REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

MIS-

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL

supra note 19.
USA, supra note 19, at 10.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,

Letter to Alexander Haig, U.S. Secretary of State,

SION TO THE KINGDOM OF MOROCCO,

24,
25.
in

CORRESPONDENCE EXCHANGED BETWEEN AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL

AND THE

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA IN RELATION TO MILITARY As-

10, 17 (1981) (AI Index: AMR 29/
56/81); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN EL SALVADOR, supra note 19, at 45 (citing common article 3).
26. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S CURRENT CONCERNS
IN EL SALVADOR, supra note 19, at 2.
27. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, MEMORANDUM PRESENTED TO THE GOVERNMENT
SISTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF EL SALVADOR
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tary and security forces not only learn these rules, but abide by them.2"
C.

Reports Issued by the InternationalCommission of Jurists

The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has used humanitarian law in a sophisticated and careful fashion on some occasions and
has almost ignored it on others. The degree to which the authors of the
various ICJ reports understood humanitarian law or carefully assessed
the distinct challenge presented by specific armed conflict situations may
explain this diversity of practice. For example, in 1972 the ICJ published a staff study (Pakistan Report) of the events in East Pakistan in
1971 that led to the creation of Bangladesh.2 9 The Pakistan Report assessed the facts presented under the provisions of the International Bill
of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Geneva Conventions, the Genocide Convention, and the customary international law prohibition concerning crimes
against humanity."0 With respect to the noninternational armed conflict
in East Pakistan, the Pakistan Report relied principally and properly on
common article 3, but it also referred to other provisions of the Geneva
Conventions in assessing the conduct of the very brief international
armed conflict between India and Pakistan."1
In 1980 the ICJ published a monograph (Israel Report I) written
largely by its affiliate in the Israeli-occupied territories of the West Bank
(West Bank). 2 The monograph, comparable both in size and complexity
to the Pakistan Report, could have used the fourth Geneva Convention
as a principal international standard in its assessment of the situation in
the West Bank. Instead, the Israel Report only mentioned the fourth
Geneva Convention briefly" and actually failed to use any other major

OF GUATEMALA

FOLLOWING A MISSION TO THE COUNTRY

(1986) (AI Index: AMR 34/01/86).
28. Id. at 37.
29. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
1971 (1972).
30. Id. at 49-62.
31. Id. at 53-55.
32. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION

IN APRIL

1985, at 34

OF JURISTS, THE EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN,

OF JURISTS

THE WEST BANK AND THE RULE OF LAW

33. Id. at 77. See also INTERNATIONAL

&

LAW IN THE SERVICE OF MAN,

(1980) [hereinafter

SERVICE OF MAN, ExCESSIVE SECRECY, LACK OF GUIDELINES:
TARY CENSORSHIP IN THE WEST BANK

ISRAEL REPORT

I].

COMMISSION OF JURISTS & LAW IN THE

(1985);

A

REPORT ON MILI-

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JU-

RISTS & LAW IN THE SERVICE OF MAN, JUSTICE? THE MILITARY COURT SYSTEM IN
THE ISRAELI OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

(1987);

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JU-

RISTS & LAW IN THE SERVICE OF MAN, TWENTY YEARS OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION OF
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international human rights standard to assess the facts presented. The
Israel National Section of the ICJ published a technically better analysis
(Israel Report II) in 1981 on the rule of law in areas administered by
Israel. 4 The Israel Report II selectively referred to the Hague Regulations, 5 the fourth Geneva Convention,"6 the European Convention on
Human Rights, and other relevant sources. The Israel Report II did not,
however, critically assess the legal arguments supporting or limiting the
Israeli practices it discussed.3"
In contrast, in 1961 the ICJ Committee of Enquiry into Events in
Bizerta, Tunisia published a report which carefully used the relevant
provisions of the Geneva Conventions to comment on allegations that the
French armed forces in Tunisia were responsible for several serious
human rights violations. 33 Another example of the ICJ's reliance on humanitarian law is the report the ICJ published in 1979 entitled Human
Rights in Guatemala (Guatemala Report), 9 which discussed the historical and contemporary violence in that country and the human rights
abuses that had occurred. The Guatemala Report mentioned the American Convention on Human Rights only in passing, however, and would
have been stronger had it referred more specifically to provisions of both

THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

34.

(1987).

ISRAEL NATIONAL SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS,

THE RULE OF LAW IN THE AREAS ADMINISTERED

ISRAEL REPORT

35.

BY ISRAEL

(1981) [hereinafter

II].

Id. at 1-2.

36. Id. at 71-72.
37.

A somewhat better analysis of these questions appears in Playfair, Administra-

tive Detention in the Israeli-OccupiedWest Bank, 13
MENSENRECHTEN 5 (Feb. 1986); see also AMNESTY
ORDERS IN ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

16/84); A.
ISRAELI

ROBERTS,

MILITARY

B.

JOERGENSEN &

F.

STUDIE-EN INFORMATIECENTRUM
INTERNATIONAL, TOWN ARREST

5-8 (1984) (AI Index: MDE 15/

NEWMAN, ACADEMIC FREEDOM UNDER

OCCUPATION: REPORT OF A WUS/ICJ

INTO HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

38.

MISSION

OF ENQUIRY

26-37 (1984).

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF

ENQUIRY INTO EVENTS IN BIZERTA, TUNISIA, BETWEEN THE 18TH AND 24TH JULY,

1961 (1961). The International Commission of Jurists also commented thoughtfully
about the application of humanitarian law to the Biafran Conflict. NigeriaIBiafra,
Armed Conflict with a Vengeance, 2 REV. INT'L COMM. JURISTS 10 (1969). But cf.
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, TIBET AND THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S REPUB-

LIC (1960) (using only the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and not mentioning

the fourth Geneva Convention).
39. D. Fox, HUMAN RIGHTS IN GUATEMALA (1979) (issued by the ICJ). See also
ISRAEL REPORT I, supra note 32, at 77 (1980) (brief citation to the fourth Geneva
Convention); ISRAEL REPORT II, supra note 34, at 1-2, 71-72 (a few more citations to
humanitarian law without adequate analysis).

1988]

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

human rights law and humanitarian law.
D. Reports Issued by Other Nongovernmental Organizations
Other nongovernmental organizations have issued fact-finding reports
on armed conflict situations that have differed considerably in their apparent awareness of international humanitarian norms. For example, the
Minority Rights Group issued a report on the Western Sahara which
discussed the armed conflict in that area, but the report cited only the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other resolutions, and the
Charter of the Organization for African Unity. The report omitted any
reference to the Geneva Conventions or other sources of humanitarian
law.4 o
A review of six recent reports by the Federation Internationaledes
Droits de l'Homme (Federation) concerning situations in which armed
conflicts have occurred indicates that the Federation cited the Geneva
Conventions with respect to a mission to Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, and
the Gaza strip,4 1 but failed to mention any standards of human rights
law or humanitarian law with regard to missions to Afghanistan,"2 El
Salvador,43 Ethiopia," Guatemala" and Honduras.48
III.

USE BY THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS:

1977-1986
A review of General Assembly resolutions and decisions from 1977 to
1986 reveals that the General Assembly has been no more consistent
than nongovernmental organizations in its references to the Geneva Con-

40. MINORITY RIGHTS GROUP, THE SAHRAWIS OF WESTERN SAHARA (Report No.
40, 1979).
41. FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, RAPPORT DE MISSION DU 26 AOUT AU 7 SEPTEMBRE 1982 EN CISJORDANIE, GAZA, ISRAEL ET LIBAN 11

(1982).
42.

FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, RAPPORT DE MIS-

SION EN AFGHANISTAN

(1985).

43.

FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, RAPPORT DE MISSION Du 21.6 AU 7.7.1981 AU SALVADOR (1981).
44. FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, TORTURE AND THE
VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN TIGRAY, ETHIOPIA (1986).
45. FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, RAPPORT DE MISSION DU 22-28 JUIN 1981 AU GUATEMALA (1981).

46.

FEDERATION INTERNATIONALE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME, RAPPORT DE MIS-

SION DU 1 AU 10 FEVRIER

1986

EN HONDURAS

(1986).
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ventions4 7 and Additional Protocols I and II,4' although once it began
citing to the Geneva Conventions it did so consistently in subsequent
years. General Assembly citations to the Geneva Conventions increased
rapidly between 1977 and 1986, increasing most dramatically in its 1986
resolutions. 49 While one could undertake a similar study with respect to
the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and other intergovernmental organizations, the present review of General Assembly actions
provides an adequate first glimpse of the problem.
During the ten-year period from 1977 to 1986, the General Assembly
adopted a number of resolutions regarding armed conflict situations.
With respect to the substantive resolutions and decisions adopted during
this ten-year period, eleven involved situations in which the General Assembly could have cited to the Geneva Conventions. These conflicts occurred in Afghanistan, Chad, Cyprus, East Timor, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, the Israeli Occupied Territories, Kampuchea,
Namibia, and Nicaragua.5 0 For convenience, this Article will group together the resolutions that do not refer to the Geneva Conventions or
Additional Protocols I and II. This Article will discuss in detail only
those resolutions that mention the Geneva Conventions or the Additional
Protocols or all these instruments.
A.

Chad, Cyprus, East Timor, Grenada,Kampuchea, and
Nicaragua

The General Assembly passed resolutions concerning conflicts in
Chad, 51 Cyprus, 52 East Timor,53 Grenada, 54 Kampuchea, 55 and Nicara47. See supra note 1.
48. See supra note 13.
49. See infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
50. The Iran-Iraq conflict is notably absent from this list. The General Assembly
deferred the question of the Iran-Iraq conflict in 1985 and 1986. See G.A. Res. 39/456
(item 44), 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 310, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985); G.A.
Res. 40/470 (item 46), 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 332, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1986).
51. G.A. Res. 35/92B, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 147, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1981).
52. G.A. Res. 32/15, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 21, U.N. Doc. A/32/45
(1978); G.A. Res. 33/15, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/33/45
(1979); G.A. Res. 34/30, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1980); G.A. Res. 37/181, 37/253, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 202, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51 (1983).
53. G.A. Res. 31/53, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 125, U.N. Doc. A/31/39
(1977); G.A. Res. 33/39, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 181, U.N. Doc. A/33/45
(1979); G.A. Res. 34/40, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 206, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
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gua.5 6 The General Assembly could have cited to the Geneva Conventions in each case, thereby alerting the parties to their obligations under
the Geneva Conventions or calling on the combatants to observe the humanitarian law norms that the Geneva Conventions establish, but they
did not.
B.

Afghanistan

The General Assembly first reviewed the Afghanistan conflict in
1981." Resolutions before 1986 had addressed concerns about refugees,
the threat to international peace, and the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Afghanistan. In 1986 the resolutions showed increased concern
about human rights violations by combatants.5 8 Reviewing the question
of human rights and fundamental freedoms in Afghanistan, the General
Assembly issued a resolution based on the United Nations Charter, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on
Human Rights, and the humanitarian rules set out in the Geneva Conventions.5" The resolution urged the parties to the Afghanistan conflict
"to apply fully the principles and rules of international humanitarian
organizations, in particular the International Committee of the Red
Cross, and to facilitate their operations for the alleviation of the suffering
of the people of Afghanistan.

'' 60

(1980); G.A. Res. 35/127, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 219, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1981); G.A. Res. 36/50, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 200, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1982); G.A. Res. 37/30, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 227, U.N. Doc. A/37/51

(1983).
54.
(1984).
55.
(1980);
(1981);
(1982);
(1983);
(1984);
(1985);
(1986).
56.
(1979).
57.
(1981).
58.
(1986).
59.
60.

G.A. Res. 38, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/38/47
G.A.
G.A.
G.A.
G.A.
G.A.
G.A.
G.A.

Res. 34/22, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 16, U.N.
Res. 35, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 13, U.N.
Res. 36, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 13, U.N.
Res. 37, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 16, U.N.
Res. 38, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 14, U.N.
Res. 39, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 16, U.N.
Res. 40/7, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 18, U.N.

Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.
Doc.

A/34/46
A/35/48
A/36/51
A/37/51
A/38/47
A/39/51
A/40/53

G.A. Res. 33/76, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 58, U.N. Doc. A/33/45
G.A. Res. 35/37, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
G.A. Res. 40/137, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 246, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
Id.
Id.
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El Salvador

The General Assembly first examined the conflict in El Salvador in
1981.61 Its 1981 resolution concerning E1 Salvador did not mention the
Geneva Conventions, although it could have. In the 1982 resolution the
General Assembly cited to the Geneva Conventions in its resolution on
the Salvadoran conflict:
The General Assembly,

. . .

4. Draws the attention of all parties con-

cerned to the fact that international rules of law, as contained in common
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, are applicable to
armed conflicts not of an international character and requests the parties
involved to apply a minimum standard of protection to the affected
population. 2
The General Assembly repeated this language in its 1983 resolution on
El Salvador.

63

In 1984 the General Assembly began to include references to the Additional Protocols in its resolutions on El Salvador, admonishing the
combatants to apply the standards in both the Geneva Conventions and
the Additional Protocols as "a minimum standard of protection of
human rights and of humane treatment of the civilian population." ' 4
The preamble and paragraph nine of the 1985 El Salvador resolution
cited the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. Paragraph
nine stated that the General Assembly:
Welcomes the fact that the Government of El Salvador and the insurgent
forces have agreed through indirect talks to exchange prisoners-of-war and
allow the International Committee of the Red Cross to evacuate wounded
combatants of the opposition in exchange for the release of government
officials captured in combat, appeals to all States to do what they can to
support operations of that kind and urges the Government of El Salvador
and the insurgent forces to continue those practices, which humanize the
conflict, and to agree as early as possible to respect the medical personnel
and all military hospitals as required by the Geneva Conventions. 5
61. See G.A. Res. 35/192, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 206, U.N. Doc. A/
35/48 (1981).
62. G.A. Res. 36/155, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 187, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1982).
63. G.A. Res. 37/185 (para. 2), 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 204, U.N. Doc.
A/37/51 (1983).
64. G.A. Res. 38/101 (para. 3), 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 204, U.N. Doc.
A/38/47 (1984).
65. G.A. Res. 39/119 (para. 9), 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 211, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1985).
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In 1986 the General Assembly issued an even stronger statement regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional
Protocols to the Salvadoran conflict. The resolution cited the Geneva
Conventions in the opening of the preamble. In addition, the resolution
included the following:
Consideringthat, while the armed conflict not of an international character continues, the Government and the insurgent forces are obliged to apply the minimum standards of protection of human rights and humane
treatment set out in article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, as well as Additional Protocol II, to which the republic of
El Salvador is a party, . . .The General Assembly,...
3. Expresses

... its

deep concern at the fact that serious and numerous

violations of human rights continue to take place in El Salvador owing
above all to non-fulfillment of the humanitarian rules of war and therefore requests the Government of El Salvador and the insurgent forces to
adopt measures conducive to the humanization of the conflict by observing
scrupulously the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols [of 19771.66

D.

Guatemala

The General Assembly has reviewed the Guatemala conflict since
1983.67 In its resolutions concerning Guatemala, the General Assembly
has never cited the Geneva Conventions or the Additional Protocols. Beginning in 1984, however, General Assembly resolutions on Guatemala
began referring to the Guatemalan conflict as "an armed conflict not of
an international character."6 Hence, while the General Assembly did
not officially cite to common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions or to
Additional Protocol II, as it could have, it did use the language of those
instruments, thereby expressing concern about the applicability of humanitarian law norms to the armed conflict.

66. G.A. Res. 40/139 (preamble, para. 3), 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 248,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986).
67. See G.A. Res. 37/184, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 204, U.N. Doc. A/
37/51 (1983); G.A. Res. 38/100, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 203, U.N. Doc. A/
38/47 (1984); G.A. Res. 39/120, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 203, U.N. Doc. A/
39/51 (1985); G.A. Res. 40/140, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 249, U.N. Doc. A/

40/53 (1986).
68. See supra note 67.
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E. Israeli Occupied Territories
The General Assembly has continuously cited the fourth Geneva Convention6" in its resolutions entitled "Report of the Special Committee to
Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories. '70 The General Assembly began citing
the fourth Geneva Convention in its resolutions entitled "The Situation
in the Middle East" in 1982.7' The General Assembly began citing the
fourth Geneva Convention in its resolutions on Palestinian refugees only
in 1986.72 Hence, citation to the Geneva Conventions in the various
General Assembly resolutions on the Israeli occupation of Palestinian
territories has increased over the past ten years.
F. Namibia
The United Nations General Assembly has reviewed the situation in
Namibia every year since 1977,73 although it did not cite to the Geneva
69. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1.
70. G.A. Res. 31/106, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 59) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/31/59
(1977); G.A. Res. 32/91, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 69, U.N. Doc. A/32/45
(1978); G.A. Res. 33/113, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 70, U.N. Doc. A/33/45
(1979); G.A. Res. 34/90, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 80, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1980); G.A. Res. 35/122, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 89, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1981); G.A. Res. 36/147, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 88, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1982); G.A. Res. 37/88, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 34, U.N. Doc. A/37/51
(1983); G.A. Res. 38/79, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 94, U.N. Doc. A/38/47
(1984); G.A. Res. 39/95, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 102, U.N. Doc. A/39/51
(1985); G.A. Res. 40/161, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 112, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1986).
71. G.A. Res. 36/226, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/36/51
(1982); see also G.A. Res. 37/123, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/
37/51 (1983); G.A. Res. 38/180, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/
38/47 (1984); G.A. Res. 39/146, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/
39/51 (1985); G.A. Res. 40/168, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 57, U.N. Doc. A/
40/53 (1986).
72. G.A. Res. 40/165, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 127, U.N. Doc. A/40/53
(1986).
73. G.A. Res. 31/146, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 130, U.N. Doc. A/31/39
(1977); G.A. Res. 32/9D, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 14, U.N. Doc. A/32/45
(1978); G.A. Res. 33/182, 33/206, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 21, 34, U.N.
Doc. A/33/45 (1979); G.A. Res. 34/42A, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 22, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (1980); G.A. Res. 35/227A, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 40, U.N.
Doc. A/35/48 (1981); G.A. Res. 36/121A, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 29, U.N.
Doc. A/36/51 (1982); G.A. Res. 37/233, 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 40, U.N.
Doc. A/37/51 (1983); G.A. Res. 38/36A, 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 25, U.N.
Doc. A/38/47 (1984); G.A. Res. 39/50, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 28, U.N.
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Conventions in its reviews until 1984. In that year the General Assembly
asked the United Nations Council for Namibia to "accede to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949 and the Additional Protocols thereto."7 4
The next year, the General Assembly declared,
that the liberation struggle in Namibia is a conflict of an international
character in terms of article 1, paragraph 4, of Additional Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and, in this regard, demands that
the Conventions and Additional Protocol I be applied by South Africa,
and in particular that all captured freedom fighters be accorded prisonerof-war status as called for by the Geneva Convention relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Additional Protocol thereto.75
The General Assembly repeated this declaration in the same or substantially similar form in 1985 and 1986.Y
G.

The General Assembly's Use of HumanitarianLaw

The General Assembly has cited the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols in resolutions relating to a number of armed conflicts
since 1977. Although these references have been inconsistent and often
inaccurate, the General Assembly has begun to cite to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols with increasing frequency. This recent
practice may represent a trend in which the United Nations will use the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols increasingly as a tool to
raise combatants' respect for the human rights of people directly or indirectly at risk in armed conflict situations.
IV.

SHOULD NONGOVERNMENTAL

ORGANIZATIONS AND THE

UNITED NATIONS CITE INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW IN

SUPPORT OF THiIR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS?

International human rights organizations and the General Assembly
ordinarily refer in their actions, reports, and resolutions to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and occasionally, for the principle of nonrefoulement, to
Doc. A/39/51 (1985); G.A. Res. 40/97A, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 44, U.N.

Doc. A/40/53 (1986).
74.

G.A. Res. 37/233C (para.12), 37 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 42, U.N. Doc.

A/37/51 (1983).
75. G.A. Res. 38/36A (para. 56), 38 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 47) at 29, U.N. Doc.
A/38/47 (1984).
76. G.A. Res. 39/50A (para. 66), 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 33, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1985); G.A. Res. 40/97A (para. 72), 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986).
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the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
When the United Nations and nongovernmental organizations confront human rights violations in the context of armed conflicts, international humanitarian law often provides an additional legal foundation for
their concerns. In some cases, international humanitarian law may even
offer a stronger basis for human rights work than the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."
The principal multilateral treaties that govern international humanitarian law apply more broadly than the main human rights treaties. As
of December 31, 1986, 162 nations had ratified the Geneva Conventions;
55 nations had ratified Additional Protocol I; and 48 nations had become
party to Additional Protocol I.78 In contrast, only 83 nations had ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966
while 86 had accepted the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights. 9

77. Scholars have begun to comment on the convergence of humanitarian and human
rights law. See, e.g., THE NEW HUMANITARIAN LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT (A. Cassese
ed. 1979); Dinstein, Human Rights in Armed Conflict: InternationalHumanitarian
Law, in 2 HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 345 (T. Meron ed. 1984); Draper,
Human Rights and the Law of War, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 326 (1972); Marks, Principles
and Norms of Human Rights Applicable in Emergency Situations: Underdevelopment,
Catastrophes and Armed Conflicts, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 175, 193-94 (K. Vasak ed. 1982); Meron, Human Rights in Time of Peace and
in Time of Armed Conflict, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (T.
Buergenthal ed. 1984); Paust & Blaustein, War Crimes Jurisdictionand Due Process:
The Bangladesh Experience, 11 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 15-18 (1978); Robertson,
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, in STUDIES IN HONOUR OF JEAN PICTET,
supra note 8, at 793; Schindler, Human Rights and HumanitarianLaw: The Interrelationship of the Laws, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 935 (1982); L. Sohn, Fundamental Guarantees,
Human Rights, Seminario Interamericano Sobre Seguridad del Estado, Derechos Humanos y Derecho Humanitario, San Jose, Costa Rica, 27 September - 2 October, 1982; see
also M. EL KOUHENE, LES GARANTIES FONDAMENTALES DE LA PERSONNE EN DROIT
HUMANITAIRE ET DROITS DE L'HOMME 8-12 (1986); INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL

HUMANITARIAN

ISSUES,

MODERN

WARS:

THE

HUMANITARIAN

CHALLENGE
143 (1986); LES DIMENSIONS INTERNATIONALES Du DROIT
HUMANITAIRE 345 (1986); T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL STRIFE:
THEIR INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 3-17 (1987). At the same time many scholars and

significant actors in the field of human rights have ignored humanitarian law. See, e.g.,
HUMAN DIGNITY, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (A. Henkin ed.
1978).

78.

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, ANNUAL REPORT

1985, at

87 (1986).

79. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED NATIONS COVENANTS ON HUMAN
RIGHTS AND CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE: CHARTS OF STATUS (1986) (AI Index:
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Generally, the international legal community recognizes the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 as restatements of international humanitarian law applicable to all countries."0 Respected scholars believe that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with the two International
Covenants on Human Rights, constitutes an authoritative interpretation
of the human rights obligations of all United Nations members and may
contain provisions that qualify as customary international law. n"
Some principles of international humanitarian law are more specific
or more exacting than the provisions of international human rights law.
Humanitarian law applies specifically to emergency situations; international human rights law permits significant derogations during these
same periods."2
Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
provides that in situations threatening the life of the nation, a government may suspend most human rights protections as long as (1) the exigencies of the situation strictly require such a suspension, (2) the suspension does not conflict with the nation's other international obligations
(such as the Geneva Conventions), and (3) the government informs the
United Nations Secretary General immediately. Article 4 does not permit any derogation from the right to be free from discrimination on the
basis of race, color, sex, language, religion, or social origin. It also permits no derogation from the rights to be free from arbitrary killing; torture, or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; slavery;
imprisonment for debt; retroactive penalties; or the failure to recognize a
person before the law. 8
In the eighty-three countries that have ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, some of the most important human
rights would be protected as nonderogable rights. Such protection would
encompass prohibitions against torture, inhuman treatment, and extrajudicial executions. Other rights, such as the right to be free from arbitrary

IOR 51/01/86).
80.
1982;

See, e.g., S.

MALLISON & W. MALLISON, ARMED CONFLIcT IN LEBANON,
LAW IN A REAL WORLD SETTING 67-68 (1983).

HUMANITARIAN

See, e.g., E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMU50-55 (1964); Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 15 (1982).
82. See Meron, Towards a HumanitarianDeclarationon Internal Strife, 78 AM.
J. INT'L L. 859 (1984).
83. See Hartman, Derogationsfrom Human Rights Treaties in Public Emergencies,
22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1981). Although war was the scenario that figured most prominently in the minds of the drafters of the derogation clauses, derogations have been invoked because of internal disturbances. Id. at 13.
81.

NITY
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arrest or detention and the right to a prompt and fair trial, would be
4
subject to derogation in times of public emergency.
Many governments are not parties to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and, therefore, do not even have to take the
formal steps to derogate from the obligations set forth in that treaty.
Although these governments may still be bound to respect such nonderogable rights as freedom from torture and arbitrary killing, one must
question whether they are bound by all the nonderogable rights that the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights identifies. In this respect, human
rights organizations rely on the rights defined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which contains no derogation clause similar to
article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
which is applicable to all governments. But article 29 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights contains a general limitation clause for all
the rights contained in that instrument, including even the prohibitions
against torture, arbitrary killing, and similar acts. Article 29 states:
In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only

to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of
securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others
and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society.8 5
The terms "morality," "public order," and "general welfare in a dem-

ocratic society" are quite vague. Broadly interpreted, they could undermine all the rights in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Several considerations support the proposition that one should not interpret
these limitations so broadly. First, a standard tenet of treaty construction

84.

The American Convention on Human Rights is more protective of human rights

than is the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights during periods of public
emergency. Article 27 of the American Convention on Human Rights makes nonderogable rights to juridical personality, to life, to humane treatment, to nationality, to a
name, and to participate in government as well as rights of the family and of the child,

freedom of conscience and religion, and freedom from slavery and ex post facto laws. In
addition, the American Convention on Human Rights protects the right to judicial guar-

antees essential to the protection of these rights, from which a government cannot derogate during periods of war, public danger, or other emergency. Common article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and article 6 of Additional Protocol II protect guarantees for fair
procedure in periods of noninternational armed conflict. See INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, STATES OF EMERGENCY, THEIR IMPACT ON HUMAN

RIGHTS

426-27

(1983). Article 75 of Additional Protocol I provides extensive procedural protections for
the accused during periods of international armed conflict. Protocol I, supra note 13, art.
75.

85. G.A. Res. 217A (art. 29), U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
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is that one should interpret limitation and exception clauses narrowly in
order to preserve the substantive rights granted. The European Court
and the European Commission on Human Rights have interpreted similar exceptioii clauses in the European Convention on Human Rights
narrowly.8 6 Second, one must question whether morality, public order,
or general welfare could ever justify torture, arbitrary killing, or similar
actions. Third, many countries cannot claim to be democratic societies
and cannot make use of the broad limitations of article 29. Fourth, one
might find in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
an authoritative interpretation of what the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and article 29 in particular, means. Hence, one might
read article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
into the rather vague limitations of article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and thus make at least certain rights (such as the
right to be free from torture and arbitrary killing) nonderogable even in
times of public emergency. But other rights, such as the right to be free
from arbitrary arrest or detention or the right to receive a prompt and
fair trial, would still be subject to general limitation, or at least limitation in times of public emergency.
In any case, neither the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights nor the Universal Declaration of Human Rights constitutes a
completely satisfactory legal basis for the human rights concerns of nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations, particularly when
these concerns arise during armed conflicts or other public emergencies.
At a minimum, humanitarian legal principles constitute an important
body of international law that human rights organizations have used and
can continue to use in appropriate situations.
Several impediments to the use of international humanitarian law exist. First, international humanitarian law includes a relatively unfamiliar
body of principles. Human rights organizations must communicate their
concerns in a sufficiently simplistic fashion in order to attract media attention and to benefit from the pressure of public opinion. Humanitarian
law adds to the complexity of the legal principles that human rights organizations must communicate to the media, the public, and human
rights activists. The staff and members of human rights organizations
have only begun to understand humanitarian law norms sufficiently to
use these norms in their reports and campaign work. At first glance,
international humanitarian law may appear dauntingly complex and,

86.

See Hartman, supra note 83, at 23-29.
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therefore, difficult for human rights organizations to use. Most of the
articles of the Geneva Conventions are not directly relevant to the principal concerns of human rights organizations, but a few provisions, such as
common article 3, are quite brief, straightforward, easily explained, and
directly applicable to the concerns of most human rights organizations."7
The second obstacle to the use of international humanitarian law is
the most problematic: to apply humanitarian law, one must ordinarily
determine what sort of armed conflict is occurring and, thus, which set of
humanitarian principles is relevant.8 " This determination is often difficult, involving issues that are politically sensitive, facts that are outside

87. For example, common article 3 reads:
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be
bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed
forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness,
wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded on race, colour, religion or faith,
sex, birth or wealth, or any other similar criteria.
To this end, the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any time and
in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel
treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous
judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples.
(2) The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for.
An impartial humanitarian body, such as the International Committee of the
Red Cross, may offer its services to the Parties to the conflict.
The Parties to the conflict should further endeavour to bring into force, by
means of special agreements, all or part of the other provisions of the present
Convention.
The application of the preceding provisions shall not affect the legal status of
the Parties to the conflict.
Geneva Conventions, supra note 1, common art. 3.
88. The Helsinki Watch report on Afghanistan cites various provisions of humanitarian law but fails to analyze adequately the nature of the conflict and the consequent
application of particular instruments of humanitarian law. HELSINKI WATCH, "TEARS,
BLOOD AND CRIES" HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE INVASION 1979-

1984 (1984). Compare the far more careful approach of AMERICAS WATCH, VIOLA1981-1985, supra note
16, at 11-34 and the somewhat less complete approach of AMERICAS WATCH, THE MISKITOS IN NICARAGUA 1981-1984, at 49 (1984).
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the normal research competence of human rights organizations, and decisions that may conflict with ICRC judgments.
A.

The Four Types of Armed Conflict

International humanitarian law was specifically designed to limit
human rights violations against protected persons, such as soldiers who
are wounded or otherwise hors de combat and the civilian population,
during periods of armed conflict. International humanitarian law distinguishes four types of armed conflict and applies different legal principles
and instruments to each type.89 International human rights law, rather
than international humanitarian law, applies when sporadic violence, internal disturbances, and tensions are present.9"
Commentators have suggested that yet a fifth category of armed conflict exists: internal armed conflicts that have become "internationalized"
by virtue of the foreign assistance provided to one side or the other.9"
The Geneva Conventions and other humanitarian law instruments do
not contain specific provisions dealing with an internationalized civil
war. Accordingly, one must analyze such conflicts from a legal standpoint as falling within one of the other four categories. For example, as
between any two foreign states intervening on behalf of opposing sides in
a civil war, international humanitarian law would apply in its entirety.
Similarly, as between the established government of a country and another government that is aiding the insurgents in a civil war, the humanitarian law of international armed conflict would apply, although there
may be some practical difficulties in application.
As between the two sides in a civil war, common article 3 and Addi-

89. The four categories are: (1) international armed conflicts to which the four Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I, the Hague rules, and other legal principles
apply; (2) wars of liberation or self-determination, which are principally defined by and
subject to Additional Protocol I; (3) noninternational armed conflicts subject to the regulation of common article 3 and to some customary norms; and (4) noninternational armed
conflicts, which are narrowly defined and regulated by Additional Protocol II.
90. See, e.g., COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949,
at 49-50 (J. Pictet ed. 1952) (discussing criteria for deciding whether an internal conflict
constitutes a noninternational armed conflict to which common article 3 applies) [hereinafter COMMENTARY (1952)].
91. See, e.g., Falk, InternationalLaw and the United States Role in the Viet Nam
War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122, 1123-25 (1966); Schindler, InternationalHumanitarianLaw
and Internationalized Internal Armed Conflicts, 22 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 255
(1982). This category might include the civil war in Spain during the 1930s, Vietnam
(1945-1975), Chad (sporadically, 1968-present), Lebanon (1976-present) and Afghanistan (1979-present).
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tional Protocol II might apply if the various conditions for armed conflict
not of an international character are met. Finally, as between the insurgents and a state assisting the established government, an analysis would
be necessary to determine whether the conditions existed to fulfill a
noninternational armed conflict, because the insurgents would lack the
requisite status in international law. The assisting government may still
wish to apply the full panoply of international humanitarian law because it is fighting on the territory of another country, although by invitation. Other possible relationships and circumstances may arise in the
context of an internationalized civil war, but one must assess any such
conflict, in any case, under the four categories previously identified.
1. International Armed Conflict or Occupation
Most of the provisions of the four Geneva Conventions "apply to all
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise
between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of
war is not recognized by one of them."9 2 In addition, the Geneva Conventions apply to partial or total occupation of the territory of a High
Contracting Party. 3 Even if one or more of the parties to the armed
conflict have not ratified the treaties, the ratifying parties are neverthe94
less bound to obey the Geneva Conventions.
The authoritative ICRC commentary on the Geneva Conventions defines international armed conflict as any "difference arising between two
States and leading to the intervention of members of the armed forces...
even if one of the Parties denies the existence of a state of war. It makes
no difference how long the conflict lasts, or ... the number of victims." 95
2. Wars of National Liberation or Self-Determination
Additional Protocol I states that international armed conflicts include:
armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the

92. Geneva Conventions, supra note 1, common art. 2.
93. Id.

94. Id.
95.

COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF

Pictet ed. 1960) [hereinafter COMMENTARY (1960)].

12

AUGUST,

1949, at 28 (J.
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Charter of the United Nations.
3.

6

Noninternational Armed Conflict Under Common Article 3

Common article 3 applies a limited number of very basic protections
to "armed conflict not of an international character." 97 Common article 3
does not define noninternational armed conflict, however, so as to distinguish it from unorganized and short-lived insurrection or a mere act of
banditry.
Nevertheless, the authoritative ICRC commentary mentions a number
of nonobligatory but convenient criteria for applying common article 3.98
Even if some of these criteria are not met, the ICRC believes that parties
should apply common article 3 as widely as possible. Common article 3
was intended to reflect the "few essential rules" that governments should
follow in peacetime and in war as well as in dealing with common
criminals or rebels."9 The drafters intended that common article 3 would

96. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 1, para. 4.
97. Geneva Conventions, supra note 1, common art. 3.
98. Proposed during the discussion preparatory to its adoption, they provide:
(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the
Convention.
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military
forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the
national territory.
(3) (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents;
or
(b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or
(c) that it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the purposes
only of the present Convention; or
(d) that the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or the
General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international peace, a
breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organization purporting to have the characteristics of a State.
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons
within a determinate territory.
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of the organized civil authority
and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the
Convention.
COMMENTARY

(1952), supra note 90, at 49-50. See generally E.

note 1.
99. See supra note 87.

ROSENBLAD,

supra
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protect those basic and fundamental rights that deserve respect at all
times. A precise definition of noninternational armed conflict is, therefore, not critical.
One might argue that if a government is willing to derogate from its
responsibilities under article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights for an "emergency that threatens the life of the nation," the government should be willing to acknowledge in appropriate
circumstances the existence of a noninternational armed conflict under
common article 3. Governments are, nevertheless, often unwilling to accept the application of common article 3. A number of international conflict situations have arisen, however, in which the government involved
has acknowledged the application of common article 3. These situations
include those in Guatemala (1954), French-Algeria (1956), Lebanon
(1958), Cuba (1958), the Congo (1960-1964), Yemen (1962-1967), the
United States in Vietnam (1964), the Dominican Republic (1965), Nigeria (1967-1970), Uruguay (1972), Chile (1973) and Cyprus (1974).100
There have been, of course, many other armed conflicts that might have
qualified for common article 3 treatment, but the governments involved
failed to acknowledge its application.
4.

Noninternational Armed Conflict Under Additional Protocol II

Additional Protocol II attempts to define more precisely than common
article 3 the sorts of "armed conflicts not of an international character"
to which Additional Protocol II applies. Hence, article 1(l) of Additional
Protocol II specifies several of the criteria that the ICRC suggested solely
for the interpretation of common article 3:
This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing
conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not
covered by Article I of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1) and which take place in the territory
of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident

armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible
command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to

100.

See Veuthy, 65 Conflicts armes de Caractere non Internationalet le Droit
CURRENT PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 179 (A. Cassese ed.
1976); cf. E. ROSENBLAD, supra note '1, at 171-72 (listing armed conflicts from 1945-

Humanitaire, in
1974).

See generally M.

VEuTHY, GUERILLA ET DROIT HUMANITAIRE

(1976).

1988]

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

implement this Protocol. 1'
Additional Protocol II thus establishes a higher threshold of applicability than the plain words of common article 3 by specifying several
requirements, which the ICRC included only as suggestions, for interpreting common article 3. It also added some new elements. These new
elements include requirements that armed forces of a High Contracting
Party be involved in the conflict and that dissident armed groups must
exercise a degree of territorial control to enable them to "carry out sustained, concerted military operations."' 2 Additional Protocol II thus appears to require for its application what one would ordinarily consider to
be a civil war.
Nevertheless, because Additional Protocol II does not replace common
article 3 but rather develops and supplements it, the broader terms of
common article 3 would still cover conflicts that fall short of Additional
Protocol II requirements, so long as there is more than internal disturbance and tensions to which only international human rights law apply.
Thus, instead of clarifying the concept of noninternational armed conflict, Additional Protocol II adds another tier of protection to certain
kinds of internal conflict.
B.

Is There a Need to Distinguish Among the Four Types of Armed
Conflict?

The factors that might indicate the application of humanitarian law. 3
are based on objective factual determinations. Yet governments, insurgent
groups, the ICRC, the United Nations, and human rights organizations
may interpret those provisions and the relevant facts in quite different
ways. Obviously, governments will not implement some of the provisions
of humanitarian law if they refuse to acknowledge their international
responsibilities, but in such circumstances the government is the party
who violated its treaty obligations.
The ICRC does not generally indicate publicly whether it classifies a
particular situation as involving (1) an international armed conflict to
which the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I apply, (2) a
war of self-determination to which Additional Protocol I applies, (3) a
noninternational armed conflict to which common article 3 applies, (4) a

101. Protocol II, supra note 13, art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. E.g., the Geneva Conventions on international armed conflict, common article 3
for noninternational armed conflicts, and the requisites for triggering Additional Protocol
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noninternational armed conflict to which Additional Protocol II applies,
or (5) merely internal disturbances or tensions not subject to regulation
under the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. Instead, the
ICRC usually bases its actions on article VI of the Statute of the ICRC,
which provides for a right of humanitarian initiative: "It takes any humanitarian initiative which comes within its role as a specifically neutral
and independent institution and intermediary and considers any question
requiring examination by such an institution."' 4 While the Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocols may provide the ICRC with a
stronger legal basis for its activities, the ICRC has found it easier to
obtain access to prisoners without requiring the government concerned to
acknowledge, even implicitly, that a certain kind of armed conflict might
be occurring. 105 For example, the ICRC has invoked its right of humanitarian initiative when visiting prisoners in El Salvador, despite the fact
that El Salvador has ratified Additional Protocol II. By its terms, Additional Protocol II probably applies to the situation, and at least common
article 3 applies. Indeed, the ICRC might have concluded in an internal
analysis that Additional Protocol II should apply. But it is easier to obtain access to prisoners by continuing to approach El Salvador under the
vague and pragmatic right of humanitarian initiative.
Another reason exists for the ICRC's general practice of not making
public legal assessments of the precise sort of armed conflict that might
be occurring. Although legal distinctions exist among these different sorts
of armed conflicts, the ICRC, governments and others often refer to the
more detailed provisions of the Geneva Conventions applicable to international conflicts as a source of interpretation and guidance with regard
to the less exacting provisions applicable to other sorts of armed conflicts.
For example, as to the internment in Switzerland of Soviet soldiers captured by an Afghan opposition group, the ICRC referred specifically to
Article 111 of the third Geneva Convention, even though that convention
might not apply to the armed conflict because the provision itself relates
only to prisoners of war held by another state party."0 6
It is interesting to note that the ICRC's policy of not discussing its
analysis of the application of the Geneva Conventions to specific situations does not prevent the ICRC Annual Report and Review from pub104. Statute of the International Committee of the Red Cross, art. 6. See also id. art.
4(2).
105. See Veuthy, Pour une politique humanitaire 12-13 in STUDIES IN HONOUR OF
JEAN

PIcT'rE,

supra note 8.

106. See ICRC, External Activities: Asia, 22
(1982).

INT'L REV. RED CROSS

231, 234
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lishing statements which imply that certain preliminary conclusions must
have been made. For example, in a section of its 1982 Annual Report
describing the work of the ICRC in Southern Africa, the ICRC mentions 114 Angolan "prisoners of war" held in Namibia, two "prisoners
of war" (a Russian and a Cuban) held in South Africa, and "two Soviet
citizens detained by UNITA.' 110 7 The use of the term "prisoners of war"

indicates that the ICRC has concluded that the third Geneva Convention
applies. The failure to use the same terminology for the two Soviet citizens held by UNITA indicates, correctly, that the third Geneva Convention could not apply because UNITA is a nongovernmental entity not
party to the Geneva Conventions.
The ICRC has developed another exception to its normal practice for
particularly grave and long-standing problems. Hence, the ICRC was
prompted by a resolution of the International Red Cross Conference in
1981 to acknowledge that the Geneva Conventions, or at least common
article 3, apply to the Western Sahara, Ogaden, and Afghanistan.' The
International Red Cross Conferences and the ICRC had previously
stated that the fourth Geneva Convention applies to the Occupied Territories of the Middle East.'0 9
If human rights organizations other than the ICRC are to apply humanitarian law principles, they must necessarily make conclusions about
the classification of a particular armed conflict. But should these organizations announce their categorization of armed conflicts, particularly
when the ICRC is so reticent about such pronouncements?
International nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations
need not announce publicly every logical step leading to their decision to
cite a particular provision of humanitarian law. Experts will understand
that these organizations must have made the necessary preliminary analysis. These international organizations should not be diverted from their
principal attention to human rights violations.
For example, a human rights organization might simply observe that
the Government of Country A has, by torturing prisoners, violated article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 7 of the

107. ICRC, ANNUAL REPORT 1982, at 14-16 (1983).
108. Humanitarian[Afctivities of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Crossfor

the [B]enefit of [V]ictims of [A]rmed [Clonflicts, res. 4, TWENTY-FOURTH
(1981), reprinted in 21
CROSS 321 (1981) [hereinafter Humanitarian[Ajctivities].

TIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS

INTERNA-

INT'L REV. RED

109. See Application of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 in the

[O]ccupied [T]erritoriesin the Middle East, res. 10, TWENTY-THIRD

INTERNATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS (1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 518
(1977).
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and common article 3. The human rights organization might amplify this observation by
stating that Country A had ratified the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights in 1974 and the Geneva Conventions in 1964. It
would not be necessary to state further that the human rights organization had concluded that common article 3 applied because an armed conflict not of an international character was occurring in Country A.
The current situation in Israel provides a concrete example of this
process. Although Israel has generally denied that the fourth Geneva
Convention applies to the Occupied Territories, it nonetheless frequently
proceeds to defend its conduct as complying with the substance of humanitarian law, including the fourth Geneva Convention.'" Although
the United Nations, the ICRC, the United States Department of State,
and most other authorities reject Israel's position on the application of
the fourth Geneva Convention to the Occupied Territories, the human
rights organization need not take a position on this issue. Indeed, if the
human rights organization's principal purpose is to persuade Israel to
prevent human rights violations, adopting a potentially controversial position might be both unnecessary and unwise. The human rights organization need do only what Amnesty International has done in its recommendations to the government of the State of Israel."' When Israeli
authorities have justified their use of administrative detention or restriction orders on the basis of article 78 of the fourth Geneva Convention,
Amnesty International has simply maintained that no government should
restrict individuals without charge or trial."' Amnesty International did
not always refer to the fourth Geneva Convention, but when the Israeli
government cited the provisions of the fourth Geneva Convention to defend its actions, Amnesty International responded on the basis of that
11 3
treaty.

110.

See, e.g.,

AN AMNESTY

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE STATE OF

3-7 June 1979, at 61 (1980) (AI Index: MDE/15/02/80) [hereinafter ISRAEL
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS] (justifying deviation from the ordinary rules of evidence in the military courts as consistent with the fourth Geneva Convention).
ISRAEL,

111.

See, e.g., id.; TowN ARREST ORDERS IN ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRIsupra note 37.
112. See TOWN ARREST ORDERS IN ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES,
supra note 37, at 5-8; see also ISRAEL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note
110, at 30 (discussing Israeli government's justification of trying security suspects before
military tribunals as consistent with article 66 of the fourth Geneva Covenvention and
Amnesty International's response).
113. See ISRAEL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 110, at 54-57 (IsTORIES,
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It should be clear that intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations are not required to cite provisions of humanitarian law except
where such citation would appear useful in protecting human rights. In
addition, consideration should be given to the use of humanitarian law
not as a primary source of applicable norms but as a point of reference.
For example, a human rights organization should not say: "These trial
procedures violated common article 3." Instead, the report might observe:
"Such trial procedures are forbidden even in periods of civil war under
common article 3." Such a use of humanitarian law would obviate the
need to characterize a situation as a certain type of armed conflict, or to
state that humanitarian law applied. Rather, this more subtle way of
citing humanitarian law would make use of the public perception that
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols establish the most basic, minimum standard of conduct for governments.
V.

RED CROSS WORK IN PERIODS OF ARMED CONFLICT

Because the Red Cross has long held a leading role in the protection
of human rights in armed conflict situations, other organizations should
study the work of the Red Cross to learn from its experience and to
appreciate how other organizations can supplement the work of the Red
Cross. The Red Cross is a movement with three constituent parts: (1)
the ICRC, a private institution subject to Swiss law that acts primarily
for the benefit of victims of armed conflicts, but which may undertake
humanitarian interventions on behalf of prisoners detained as a result of
internal disturbances; (2) the 130 National Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, voluntary organizations auxiliary to public authorities, which
give assistance to victims of natural disasters or armed conflicts and
which engage in various humanitarian activities related to medical care,
public health, and social welfare; and (3) the League of Red Cross Societies, the federation of the National Societies that coordinates their activities in peacetime."1

raeli government's use of article 5 of the fourth Geneva Convention to justify denying

suspected terrorists immediate access to lawyers and Amnesty International's response).
114. See generally ICRC, THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1983) (ICRC
Doc. CD/7/1, prepared for the Red Cross Council of Delegates, 13-14 Oct. 1983) [hereinafter THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS]; see also Dominice, The Implementation
of HumanitarianLaw, in 2 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
427, 439-43 (K. Vasak & P. Alston eds. 1982); Forsythe, Present Role of the Red Cross
in Protection in FINAL REPORT: AN AGENDA FOR THE RED CROSS (1975); J. MOREILLON, LE COMITE INTERNATIONAL DE LA CROIX-ROUGE ET LA PROTECTION DES
DETENUS POLITIQUES (1973); J. PICTET, RED CROSS PRINCIPLES (1956).
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Article 6, paragraph 4 of the Statute of the International Red Cross
prescribes three categories of tasks for the ICRC in armed conflicts: "[1]
To undertake-the tasks incumbent on it under the Geneva Conventions,
[2] to work for the faithful application of these Conventions and [3] to
take cognizance of any complaints regarding alleged breaches of the humanitarian conventions.""1 5
A. Fulfilling the ICRC's Tasks Under HumanitarianLaw
The tasks in the first category relate to the specific provisions of the
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols that authorize ICRC action. First, the ICRC visits prisoners of war and civilian internees, interviews them without witnesses, and repeats such visits under article 126
of the third Geneva Convention and articles 76 and 143 of the fourth
Geneva Convention." 6 The principal purposes of the visits are to assure
that prisoners are not killed or mistreated and, in some cases, to provide
prisoners with items such as blankets, medicines, soap, warm clothing,
food, educational material, medical care, and recreational material.1 1
Second, the ICRC provides relief to the inhabitants of occupied territories under articles 50, 59, and 61 of the fourth Geneva Convention. 1 "
Third, pursuant to article 123 of the third Geneva Convention and article 140 of the fourth Geneva Convention, the ICRC has established a
Central Tracing Agency (CTA) that collects information on prisoners of
war and civilians in occupied territories (particularly those who are interned) so the CTA can establish and maintain contact with the prisoners' families." 9 Fourth, the CTA also searches for missing persons in the
event of armed conflicts, pursuant to article 33(3) of Additional Protocol
I.20 Fifth, if children are evacuated under article 78(1) of Additional
Protocol I, the ICRC monitors the relocation to assure the return of the
children to their families.12 ' Sixth, the ICRC helps to establish and identify clearly hospitals and safety areas protected from international armed
conflict under article 23 of the first Geneva Convention and article 14 of
the fourth Geneva Convention.' 2 2 Finally, in the event of noninterna-

115.
para. 4.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
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Statute of the International Committee of the Red Cross, supra note 104, art. 6,
See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 114, at 31.

at
at
at
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31-32.
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tional armed conflict, and pursuant to common article 3, the ICRC may
take humanitarian initiatives to offer its services to the parties to assist
victims and to engage in activities similar to those it performs in interna12 3
tional conflicts.
B.

EncouragingFaithful Application of HumanitarianLaw

The second category of tasks that article 6 of the Statute of the International Red Cross identifies requires the ICRC to "work for the faithful application of" the four Geneva Conventions and presumably the
more recent Additional Protocols. The ICRC thus monitors the compliance of parties to armed conflicts to assure that they implement all the
provisions of the four Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols.
The ICRC's three principal techniques for assessing the fulfillment of
these humanitarian law norms are: (1) visiting places of detention; (2)
making official or unofficial approaches to the authorities; and (3) making use of its right to take humanitarian initiatives.12
1. Visiting Places of Detention
In connection with visits to places of detention, ICRC delegates may
check if detainees are being treated in accordance with the provisions of
humanitarian law, draw the attention of the authorities to any problems,
and ascertain through repeated visits whether the parties have taken ap12
propriate remedial measures. 6
2.

Approaches to Authorities

Whenever it has reason to believe that a violation of humanitarian law
has occurred or may be prevented, the ICRC may approach the relevant
authorities. In principle, it makes such representations without any publicity because its primary task is to aid the victims of armed conflicts.
The ICRC thus communicates its concerns in confidence to the authorities because it does not wish to become engaged in public controversies
1 26
that might jeopardize its assistance and protection work for victims.
While the ICRC's efforts to end violations of international humanitarian law or to prevent such violations are in principle confidential, the
123. Id. at 35.
124. See infra notes 126-41 and accompanying text.
125. See THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 114, at 31.
126. See ICRC, Action by the ICRC in the Event of Breaches of InternationalHurmanitarian Law, 21 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 76, 77-78 (1981) [hereinafter IORC,
Action].
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ICRC takes a different approach when necessary. The ICRC reserves
the right to publicly denounce violations of international humanitarian
law when the violations are significant, confidential efforts have not ended the violations, public statements will benefit the threatened persons,
and ICRC delegates witnessed the violations or otherwise verified the
12 7
existence of the violations through reliable sources.
The actual effect of the ICRC's techniques is far more subtle. Although the ICRC approaches governments in confidence, the mere fact
that it has become aware of certain information presents government authorities with an implicit threat that the information will somehow become more broadly known, particularly if the government takes no remedial action. The ICRC publishes far more information than many people
realize. In its monthly newsletter, its Annual Report, its Review, and
occasional press releases, the ICRC often publishes information about
the places of detention it has visited, the prisoners it has interviewed, the
times the visits occurred and the number of detainees.
When a situation becomes particularly grave the ICRC rarely publishes full reports, as the policy statement quoted above and the ICRC's
public statements on Iran and Iraq of May 1983 and February 1984
indicate.12 The ICRC has previously issued public appeals concerning
such issues as the killings in the refugee camps of Lebanon and the conflict that occurred in Southern Rhodesia.' 2 9 In the context of civil wars,
the ICRC has called on the parties to refrain from attacking civilian
populations, as it did, for example, in the conflicts in the Congo (1964),
Nigeria (1967) and Vietnam (1965 and 1968).111
In May 1983 the ICRC issued a public appeal to both Iran and Iraq
to honor their obligations under the Geneva Conventions.' The appeal
described Iran's failure to permit the registration of 15,000 to 20,000

127. Id. at 81.
128. ICRC, External Activities: Middle East, 23 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 220
(1983) [hereinafter ICRC, External Activities 1983]; ICRC, ExternalActivities: Middle
East, 24 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 113 (1984) [hereinafter ICRC, External Activities
1984].
129. See ICRC, External Activities: Middle East, 22 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 360
(1982) (Lebanon); ICRC, Appeals of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, 17
INT'L REV. RED CROSS

74 (1977) (Rhodesia/Zimbabwe).

130. See ICRC, An Appeal by the International Committee, 4 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 520 (1964) (Congo); ICRC, External Activities: In Nigeria, 7 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 591 (1967) (Nigeria); ICRC, The Requirements of Humanity in Vietnam, 8
INT'L REV. RED CROSS 138 (1968) (Vietnam); ICRC, Requestfor the Rules of Humanity in Vietnam, 5 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 417, 418 (1965) (Vietnam).
131. ICRC, External Activities 1983, supra note 128.
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prisoners of war; its failure to transmit family correspondence for prisoners; its failure to allow ICRC access to prisoners; its failure to repatriate
wounded or sick prisoners; and the intimidation, death, or injury of prisoners of war. The appeal described in less detail the situation of 6,800
Iranian prisoners held by the Iraqi government. It discusses Iraq's satisfactory registration of prisoners, its satisfactory transmission of family
correspondence, its failure to permit access to certain prisoners, some illtreatment, and a few instances of brutality against prisoners.
The appeal concluded with the statement that both Iran and Iraq have
committed "grave breaches" of human rights law by summarily executing captured or wounded soldiers, by abandoning the wounded on the
field of battle, and by bombing civilian targets.132 The ICRC repeated
this public reproach of Iran and Iraq in February 1984.33 This public
disapproval apparently made both Iran and Iraq less willing to accept
the humanitarian assistance of the ICRC, but the situation possibly
marked the limits of ICRC willingness to cooperate with governments
that gravely breach their legal responsibilities.
Despite the fact that the ICRC rarely issues such public appeals, the
Iran-Iraq case is useful in assessing the ICRC's methodology, designed
essentially to use the balance of humanitarian law violations as a means
to encourage compliance. If each side in a given conflict can assure the
other side of its compliance with its treaty obligations, the Geneva Conventions will function more successfully. The balance is somewhat less
successful when public criticism of the countries arises, because the criticism demonstrates to each country that the other side is not fulfilling its
treaty obligations and also because inevitably one side will appear "better" than the other when the accounting is published.
If a government partially reveals a confidential ICRC report, the
ICRC reserves the right to release the complete report."' Accordingly,
the ICRC has released reports on prison visits in Greece under the Colonels after Greece divulged information contained in ICRC reports on the
visits.1" 5 Likewise, when the present Government of Iran disclosed information about ICRC prison visits during the reign of the Shah, the ICRC

132. Id. at 79.

133. ICRC, External Activities 1984, supra note 128, at 220.
134.

See

THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS,

supra note 114, at 31.

135. See Comite International des la Croix-Rouge Aus Detenus Politiques en
Greece, Mai 1967-Mars 1968, in

J.

BECKET, BARBARISM IN GREECE 99-102 (1970);

see also Veuthy, Implementation and Enforcement of HumanitarianLaw and Human
Rights Law in NoninternationalArmed Conflicts: The Role of the InternationalCommittee of the Red Cross, 33 Am. U.L. REV. 83, 93 (1983) [hereinafter Veuthy,
Implementation].
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released several pertinent reports documenting these visits."3 6
Periodic ICRC Conferences express concern about, and even strong
disagreement with, grave and long-standing violations of humanitarian
law. The ICRC Conference in 1981 adopted such a resolution concerning conflicts in the Western Sahara, Ogaden, and Afghanistan.137
3.

Humanitarian Initiative

To work for the faithful application of the Geneva Conventions and
the Additional Protocols, the ICRC also reserves the right to take humanitarian action (a) in all situations under article 4(2) of its own statute;... (b) in international armed conflicts under article 9 of the first
three Geneva Conventions, article 10 of the fourth Geneva Convention,
and under articles 5 and 81 of Additional Protocol I;... and (c) in noninternational armed conflicts under common article 3.140 The ICRC's right
to take humanitarian initiative is designed to assist persons protected
under the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, as well as all
others who may become the victims of armed conflict or internal strife,
subject to agreement of the authority concerned. Under its right of humanitarian initiative, the ICRC may provide relief to persons not protected under the Geneva Conventions, organize the exchange of prisoners, reunite families, ask for truces to bring care to the wounded, and
help refugees.
4.

Receiving Complaints Concerning Alleged Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law

In receiving complaints about alleged breaches of international humanitarian law, the ICRC has distinguished between two categories of
complaints: "The first category includes complaints or communications
concerning the non-application or inadequate application of one or several provisions of the Conventions by the responsible Power in respect of
persons protected by those Conventions, in circumstances where the
ICRC can take direct action in favour of such persons."'' The ICRC
then approaches the authorities to prevail on them to correct any short136. See Red Cross Found Jail Better in Shah's Last Year, Wash. Post, Jan. 10,
1980, at A23, cols. 1-4; see also Veuthy, Implementation, supra note 135, at 93.
137. See Humanitarian[A]ctivities, supra note 108, at 321.
138. See THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 114, at 35-38; Veuthy,
Implementation, supra note 135, at 87.
139. See THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 114, at 35-38.

140. Id.
141.

ICRC, Action, supra note 126, at 78-79.
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comings notified on the spot and reported by its delegates.
"The second category includes protests against grave breaches of international humanitarian law committed in circumstances where the ICRC
is unable to take direct action to help the victims."142 The breaches may,
for example, have taken place on the scene of hostilities to which the
ICRC has no access. The procedure followed by the Committee is not to
forward the protests, unless there is no other regular channel for doing
so, a neutral intermediary is necessary, and where such protests do not
come from third parties.
In the case of the first category of complaints, it is indisputable that
the actions taken by the ICRC, for example, to put an end to ill-treatment inflicted on protected persons, represent a contribution to respect
for human rights in the same way as the action taken by the Committee
on its own initiative and mentioned in the previous section. And for the
second category of complaints, the ICRC plays a very limited part, as
noted by the International Conference of the Red Cross, after it has recognized that the procedure laid down between the two world wars had
given no appreciable result. 4 The function of the ICRC as forwarding
agent seems rarely to lead to any improvement in the situation, since the
complaints usually refer to events in the past which can no longer be put
44
right.1
In addition, the four Geneva Conventions contain provisions that permit parties in conflict to establish ad hoc commissions of inquiry where
alleged violations of the Geneva Conventions have occurred.' 4 5 To date,
no two parties to a conflict have accepted such an ad hoc commission of
inquiry. Article 90 of Additional Protocol I envisions the establishment
of an International Fact-Finding Commission when twenty states parties
have acknowledged the competence of such a commission to investigate
allegations of grave breaches or other serious violations of the convena46 It is unlikely that an International
tions and Additional Protocol I.
Fact-Finding Commission will come into existence for a long time. As of
8 June 1987 only eight states out of twenty-seven parties to Protocol I
had declared their acceptance of the International Fact-Finding

142. Id. at 79.
143. Protests [R]egarding Alleged Violations of the Humanitarian Conventions,
res. 27, TWENTIETH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE RED CROSS (1965).
144. THE RED CROSS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 115, at 38-39.
145. First Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 52; Second Geneva Convnetion,
supra note 1, art. 53; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 1, art. 132; Fourth Geneva
Convention, supra note 1, art. 149.
146. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 90.
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5.

The ICRC and Other Organizations

The preceding discussion of the ICRC's work in periods of armed
conflict and internal strife raises two essential questions: first, what can
other organizations learn from the ICRC's long experience in dealing
with human rights violations in periods of armed conflict and internal
strife? and second, what should be the relationship between the ICRC
and other organizations with regard to fact-finding and other actions?
a. What Other Organizations May Learn from the ICRC
Experience
Other organizations can clearly learn from the ICRC's effective techniques. The ICRC's skillful use of the implicit threat of publicity might
help all other human rights organizations. Other organizations must consider at least whether to follow the ICRC's general policy of not relying
on international law when pursuing humanitarian objectives.
If a human rights organization intends to comment on human rights
violations committed by a government on one side of an armed conflict,
the organization should include some statements in its reports detailing
the abuses that the other party has perpetrated, since those misdeeds may
be the cause of, or at least the excuse for, any repression. In many cases,
failure to do so may leave the organization open to charges of prejudice
in favor of one side of the conflict-both at the time of the report and in
the future. Nevertheless, such efforts to balance human rights reporting
may help one party to the conflict justify its previous human rights violations or future reprisals. This paradox demonstrates the difficulty of any
effort to balance reporting and the extremely hazardous character of any
increased activity in periods of armed conflict.
If a human rights organization were to publish information condemning only one side of a conflict, the international community would probably criticize the organization for taking sides or for having purveyed enemy propaganda. Because the ICRC attempts in many ways to serve as
an intermediary between belligerent parties, such as by facilitating the
exchange of prisoners, assisting wounded soldiers, and transmitting prisoner of war correspondence, an accusation of bias would be very damaging. Other human rights organizations do not attempt to serve in any
such intermediary role. If human rights organizations wish to pursue
147. See ICRO, States [P]artyto the Protocolsof 8 June 1977, 27 INT'L REV. RED.
CRoss 344 (1987).

1988]

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

their concern for human rights impartially by criticizing government violations even in times of armed conflict, these organizations must at least
be aware that governments will be particularly quarrelsome and sensitive at these times.
In considering these lessons one must understand the important differences between the ICRC and other organizations in structure, principles,
and techniques. Such a full comparison between the ICRC and other
organizations is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, a few observations seem necessary.
The ICRC and other human rights organizations differ in that most
human rights organizations apply human rights law at all times and, in
addition, may refer occasionally to humanitarian law principles where
relevant to their work. The ICRC applies humanitarian law during
armed conflicts and may take humanitarian action pursuant to its statute
at any time. The ICRC has occasionally referred to human rights law,
but it does not generally use any legal principles publicly in its work.
Such a formulation leaves a considerable area of overlap between the
work of the ICRC and other organizations. Significant differences exist,
however, in the techniques the ICRC employs ordinarily and those that
other human rights organizations employ. As discussed more fully above,
the ICRC makes most of its approaches to governments in confidence.1 8
Most human rights organizations use a range of tactics to approach governments, including direct contacts, membership appeals, and publicity
campaigns. The ICRC has both regional offices and a large central staff
that regularly visits places of detention, provides relief, and works with
National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.149 Amnesty International has a very diverse membership that provides financial support for
the organization and assists with appeals to governments.150 Amnesty International's research and fact-finding work is centralized in London. 15 1
Americas Watch and most of the other human rights organizations identified in this Article have central offices, but lack effective membership
and grass roots campaigning capacity. Americas Watch is unique in that
it has experimented with the use of "stringers" as informants who remain on-site for extensive periods. 15 2 The United Nations General Assembly, the Human Rights Commission, and other United Nations de-

148. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.

149. See ICRC,

ANNUAL REPORT

150. See AMNESTY
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1986, at 11-12 (1987).

INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 1986,

THE CIVILIAN TOLL,

tion for the report).

supra note 10, at 9-10.

supra note 15, at ix (listing sources of informa-

354

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 21:313

liberative bodies have the ability to adopt resolutions, but must rely
principally on the Secretary General to pursue more diplomatic approaches. The United Nations is generally not very effective at mustering media attention or grass roots campaigns.
A report of an Amnesty International mission to Vietnam noted one
major difference between the approaches available to the ICRC and
those available to other human rights organizations: "Amnesty International is not professionally equipped to carry out prison visits in the
manner that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can.
Thorough camp inspections necessitate lengthier visits to more camps
and would require medical expertise among the inspection team."' 15 3
Such efforts also require repeated visits to the same institution.
b.

The Relationship Between the ICRC and Other Organizations
During Periods of Armed Conflict

Bearing in mind the important differences between the ICRC and
other human rights organizations, the question remains as to how these
organizations might continue to work without unduly interfering with
each other. One possible approach would be to recognize the ICRC's
long-standing and very successful efforts in periods of armed conflict and
internal strife. One might argue that other organizations should generally leave this field to the ICRC. Other human rights organizations have
found, however, that human rights violations have occurred in times of
armed conflict. Since these organizations cannot ignore these human
rights violations, they may complement the ICRC's work with their factgathering capacity and diverse methods of action. Indeed, the ICRC has
indicated its acceptance of, and appreciation for, the role of other human
rights organizations in bringing human rights violations to the attention
of the ICRC and the public-especially when the ICRC must remain
quiet. In this regard, it is interesting to note a statement by Hans-Peter
Gasser, Legal Adviser, to the ICRC:
The aim of a number of non-governmental organizations is to promote
respect for human rights. Some of these organizations have also undertaken to exercise their activity in situations covered by the Geneva Conventions (for example the International Commission of Jurists and Amnesty International). The reports published by these two organizations,
exposing violations committed in armed conflict may help influence public
opinion. The activity of non-governmental organizations may be able to

153. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIET NAM, 10-21 DECEMBER 1979, at 13 (1980).
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promote respect for humanitarian law by the belligerents. Their independence of any State power guarantees them considerable freedom of action
and at the same time creates the conditions necessary for judgments free of
any political influence-advantages which have to go hand in hand with
impartiality and a keen sense of responsibility.'"
The discreet approach of the ICRO complements the activity of other
human rights organizations, in that generally the ICRC avoids publicity
and thus preserves its access to prisoners. Most other human rights organizations publicize violations, but such publicity may prevent them from
having much access to prisoners.
All human rights organizations must protect their separate identities,
however. The ICRC would not want to appear to be a collaborator with
more outspoken human rights organizations because statements by unrelated organizations might result in a denial of access to prisoners. The
ICJ may have particularly easy access to the authorities of a particular
country and may be able to influence those officials toward the protection
of human rights, while Amnesty International might lack such access
after publicly criticizing the same country. For the effectiveness of each
organization and for the overall effectiveness of human rights efforts,
each organization must preserve its independence and separate identity.
VI.

THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON THE FACT-FINDING
WORK OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS

In order to work effectively and credibly against violations of human
rights, organizations must be able to gather and assess relevant facts.
Armed conflict situations may hinder the fact-finding work of human
rights organizations and thus impair their ability to respond to human
rights violations during periods of armed conflict.
A.

Circumstances Affecting Fact-Findingin Periods of Armed
Conflict

Several factors ordinarily affect a human rights organization's ability
to gather information on human rights violations from any particular
country. 1 55 Situations of armed conflict may have a significant impact on
154. Paper presented by Hans-Peter Gasser to a Seminar on International Humanitarian Law for Representatives of Governments and Academic Institutions in the Asian
and Pacific Area, Canberra, Australia (Feb. 12, 1983).
155. Stephanie Grant identified most of these factors in the testimony she prepared
for Human Rights in Africa: Hearings Before the Subcomms. on Africa and on International Organizationsof the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979) (She prepared the testimony for Amnesty International USA, but her views obvi-
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several of these factors.
1. The existence of a general climate of fear.
Armed conflict and internal strife will certainly increase the level of
fear in a society and make more individuals afraid to report human
rights violations. As violence increases, the fear of arbitrary detention or
killing makes it less likely that individuals will impart information. Indeed, parties to the conflict may interpret certain information as being
defense secrets or security matters; they could conceivably view release of
such information as espionage.
2. The existence of a popular awareness of human rights norms and
an expectation that the government will not violate basic rights.
With armed conflict and internal strife, a breakdown of legal constraints on violence often arises and citizens' expectations that anything
can be done to prevent or redress human rights violations decrease.
3. The existence of an independent judiciary that can respond to reports of human rights violations from an independent bar.
Court proceedings and lawyers are ordinarily a significant source of
information about human rights violations. An increase in the general
level of lawlessness may adversely affect the independence of the legal
profession.
4. The existence of domestic organizations that concern themselves
with human rights.
Domestic organizations that ordinarily, provide information may become the subject of government opposition or repression, preventing
them from functioning properly. These organizations may also become
so involved in the conflict that their information becomes suspect.
5. The ability of the local media to report human rights matters freely.
On the one hand, press censorship ordinarily increases during wartime, thereby reducing the free flow of human rights information. On the
other hand, the war may attract certain foreign journalists, focusing international attention on the country and undermining attempts at
censorship.
6. The reliability of human rights information.
Human rights data can become suspect or less available during periods of armed conflict or internal strife if a government chooses to use it
as propaganda. For example, Amnesty International's 1984 report on El
Salvador observed that because of the armed conflict, all parties were
attempting to place responsibility for violent deaths on opposition forces,
often using intentionally biased medical and forensic evidence of dubious
ously reflected her considerable experience as head of research at the International
Secretariat.).
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authenticity to support such accusations. 56 In addition, a considerable
risk exists that much of the information gathered during periods of
armed conflict may have been filtered through one of the parties to the
conflict. Indeed, a party to the conflict may have been publicizing the
same information through several channels other than human rights organizations, such as the media. In these circumstances the credibility of
the information may be questionable and the public may perceive it to be
propaganda. In the absence of a human rights organization's own authoritative and independent research, the organization's role might be
reduced to that of a rubber stamp or a supporter for one party's propaganda campaign.157
For example, representatives of America's Watch and the Lawyer's
Committee for International Human Rights described difficulties they
encountered in determining the number of civilians affected by indiscriminate attacks by government forces in El Salvador, problems that are
common to many armed conflict situations, including: the fact that the
attacks took place in combat zones, making it difficult for human rights
monitors to reach the site of alleged abuses; the fact that eyewitnesses
were generally more preoccupied with their own safety than with recording details of abuses; the fact that civilian eyewitnesses may not always
be aware when opposition forces are in their vicinity provoking governmental attacks; and the fact that some eyewitnesses may deliberately misinform human rights observers.1 58
7. The existence of a common language easily understood by
foreigners.
Armed conflict will not significantly affect this factor, but if foreigners
cannot ordinarily understand the language of the country, thereby inhibiting the flow of information, armed conflict will diminish the information flow even further.
8. The existence of a communication infrastructure linking the country to the outside world.
Normal means of communication such as telephone lines, mail service,
and business travel may become impaired during periods of armed con-

156. EXTRAJUDICIAL EXECUTIONS IN EL SALVADOR, supra note 19, at 15. Americas Watch apparently encountered similar difficulties in assessing evidence regarding
human rights violations in Nicaragua. AMERICAS WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA 1985-1986 (1986).
157. See the problems discussed in AMERICAS WATCH, MANAGING THE FACTS:
How THE ADMINISTRATION DEALS WITH REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN EL
SALVADOR

158.
at 5-6.

(1985).
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flict and thus reduce the sources of useful information. With fewer
sources of information, the researcher cannot easily cross-check material
and assure reliability.
9. The existence of a substantial refugee or expatriate community with
access to human rights information and human rights organizations
abroad.
Wars ordinarily increase the flow of refugees, but refugees may not
have access to international human rights information and organizations
for a long time after their departure.
10. The possibility of sending a fact-finding mission to the country or
to places where refugees may be found.
During periods of armed conflict, it may be difficult to obtain permission from a government to enter a country for research missions. Travel
in some areas may be hazardous without government or opposition
group assistance, which may in turn undermine the credibility of the
fact-finding exercise.
All human rights organizations employ researchers who are assigned
to monitor human rights developments in a region of the world. The ICJ
divides its staff so that each employee covers a specific region of the
world. For example, one jurist is responsible for Asia and another is
responsible for Latin America. Because of its small staff, the International League for Human Rights can only turn its attention from one
country to another without maintaining continual monitoring. Despite its
very large staff in London, even Amnesty International must require
nearly all its researchers to investigate violations in several countries at
once. The United Nations serves largely as a passive receptacle for information that other organizations have produced, conducting little factual
research itself.
Rarely can researchers for any of these organizations do more than
collect and sift information acquired from press reports, texts of laws and
decrees, international organization reports, and unpublished testimony
from relatives of victims, former prisoners, lawyers, opposition groups,
church members, journalists, and academics. In certain countries where
research is particularly difficult, an organization must develop a more
active research strategy, including visits to refugee camps, border areas,
expatriate groups in countries that have received refugees, and diplomats
who have been stationed in the country. Such a concentrated effort may
be very difficult for a researcher assigned to several countries. This problem is aggravated even further if no other international human rights
organization has undertaken significant fact-gathering efforts.
Americas Watch and the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights have
pursued activist research strategies with regard to El Salvador and other
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countries by using short-term employees and "stringers" located in the
subject countries to prepare their reports.1 59 Amnesty International has
similarly employed a more activist information-gathering approach for
its research on Afghanistan and Albania by visiting refugees in neighboring countries.'6 °
Of course, one cannot consider the problems of research without taking into account the available fact-finding means. The situation in the
Western Sahara illustrates some of the difficulties in undertaking an activist research strategy in the highly visible and politically sensitive context of an armed conflict. A considerable store of information on human
rights issues should probably exist among the inhabitants of the refugee
camps that the Polisario Front organized around the Tindouf in Algeria.
Unfortunately, human rights researchers cannot visit these camps independently. Even if a researcher were to visit the camps under the auspices of the Polisario, everything he would see and hear would be
orchestrated, creating doubt as to the accuracy of the information. Indeed, the Polisario would probably use a visit by a human rights organization as propaganda, which might be counterproductive to human
rights objectives.
Despite these difficulties, human rights research is possible during
armed conflict situations, particularly if organizations use a more activist
fact-gathering approach. Moreover, in some cases armed conflicts may
make research easier by drawing world attention to the situation. The
conflict in El Salvador, for example, has attracted foreign journalists,
members of the United States Congress, international human rights organizations such as Americas Watch and the Lawyers Committee for
Human Rights, and even tourists. While fighting, disruptions of war,
and the repression of domestic human rights organizations have impeded
the flow of specific information on the events in El Salvador, the increased level of international attention has partially compensated for
these impediments.
B.

Problems of Research Concerning the Existence of Various Sorts
of Armed Conflict

Another difficulty inherent in research concerning human rights violations during periods of armed conflict relates to the various categories of
armed conflict. The application of humanitarian law hinges on the char159.

See supra note 152.

160. See AMNESTY

INTERNATIONAL, AFGHANISTAN: TORTURE OF POLITICAL PRISAMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ALBANIA: POLITICAL IMPRISONMENT AND THE LAw 4 (1984) (AI Index: EUR 11/04/84).

ONERS

4 (1986) (AI Index: ASA/11/04/86);
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acterization of the armed conflict. One must distinguish between international armed conflicts, wars of liberation, noninternational armed conflicts under common article 3, noninternational armed conflicts under
Additional Protocol II, and other situations. In trying to apply humanitarian law to human rights violations occurring during the above-described situations, human rights groups will not only have to make political and highly contestable conclusions about the existence of certain
sorts of armed conflict, but they will also need to base their decisions on
factual information of a kind not previously customary for human rights
research.
Numerous human rights organizations normally collect information
about matters such as torture and ill-treatment, judicial and extrajudicial
executions, "disappearances," fair trial and due process rights for detained prisoners, and the detention of political prisoners. Human rights
organizations do not normally collect information about the sort of facts
necessary to determine the existence or non-existence of an armed conflict. For example, some of the factors one must consider when applying
common article 3 include whether insurgents possess an organized military force (that is, an authority responsible for its conduct) acting within
a determinate territory and having the means to respect humanitarian
law; whether the government has recognized the insurgents; and whether
the United Nations has recognized the conflict as a threat to peace. In
the ordinary course of their work, human rights researchers may collect
facts and make tentative conclusions only about some of these subjects."' 1
The additional requirement of collecting this information in order to apply international humanitarian law would distract researchers from their
.principal research tasks and would be beyond their information base and
expertise.
VII.

THE EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPARTIALITY OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS IN COMBATTING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN
ARMED CONFLICT SITUATIONS

During periods of armed conflict, human rights organizations may encounter problems with the effectiveness of their traditional approaches to
governments. Many international organizations focus primarily on
human rights violations and seek to persuade governments to fulfill their
161. The Amnesty International Annual Report of 1986 commented on the territory
controlled by armed opposition groups in Angola, Chad, Kampuchea, and Lebanon, but
made no observation on this subject with regard to armed conflicts in Afghanistan, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Morocco, Mozambique, and the Philippines. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL ANNUAL REPORT 1986, supra note 10.
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human rights and humanitarian law obligations. The organizations employ various means to accomplish these persuasive goals: diplomatic contacts with the government; appeals through the media; letter-writing
campaigns; communications to intergovernmental organizations; and efforts to encourage other governments to intercede. Some organizations
such as Amnesty International, the United Nations, and the ICRC also
assist human rights victims. International Alert is a relatively new organization that seeks to remedy not only human rights violations but also
162
the underlying causes or conflicts that engender the violations.
Just as situations of armed conflict or internal strife have an impact
on the research efforts of human rights organizations, they also have implications for the effectiveness of these organizations in halting human
rights abuses. Indeed, a significant correlation exists between the ability
to collect relevant human rights information and the ability to take effective action. Armed conflict situations may disrupt or distort normal government functions so as to impede any approach by a human rights organization to the government.
A.

Impartiality

The problem of maintaining impartiality is one of the most difficult
issues posed for human rights workers in situations of armed conflict and
internal strife. Armed conflicts polarize the climate of public opinion. In
a polarized climate, the public will almost certainly call on a human
rights organization to express itself on numerous issues outside the organization's mandate. This problem may in turn affect the organization's
ability to act consistently in armed conflict situations. Such situations
create severe problems for a human rights organization's image of impartiality because governments that are engaged in armed conflict with
one another or with a strong opposition group are particularly sensitive
to what is perceived to be one-sided criticism. Concern for the image of
impartiality may, in armed conflict situations, place pressure on human
rights organizations to balance their criticisms-an approach that organizations have had difficultly maintaining and which may result in reduced effectiveness in curbing human rights abuses.'
162. See, e.g., SURINAME: AN INTERNATIONAL ALERT REPORT, at i (1988)
(describing International Alert and its purposes).
163. For example, Americas Watch attempted to catalogue human rights abuses by
both sides to the Nicaraguan conflict from 1981 to 1985. The group noted that while the
Permanent Commission on Human Rights, an independent human rights organization in
Nicaragua, could supply reliable, continuously monitored information about abuses by
the Nicaraguan government, no similar organization was available to monitor the Con-
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When a human rights group comments on the human rights violations
committed by a government involved in an armed conflict, the public
expects the organization to include some statements concerning the
abuses perpetrated by the other party to the conflict, whose misdeeds
may be the cause of, or at least the excuse for, the repression. Failure to
do so may leave the human rights group open to charges of prejudice in
favor of one side-both at the time of the report and possibly in the
future. Nevertheless, such efforts to balance reporting may help one
party to the conflict justify its previous human rights violations or future
reprisals. To obtain reliable information simultaneously about human
rights violations by both sides is often difficult. If the human rights organization cannot balance its reports for lack of sufficient timely information about both sides, it may not be able to issue any. This paradox
demonstrates the difficulty of any human rights organization's effort to
balance its reporting and, indeed, the extremely hazardous character of
any increased activity by these groups in periods of armed conflict.
B. Approaches Used by Human Rights Organizationsto Halt
Human Rights Abuses
Human rights groups use several different approaches to stop abuses
in a given situation. They may approach a particular government or entity privately with evidence of abuses and request that the authorities act
to stop the violations. Human rights groups may also publish reports
and issue press releases about human rights violations. Publication serves
the dual purpose of informing the international community about human
tras. VIOLATIONS OF THE LAws OF WAR BY BOTH SIDES IN NICARAGUA 1981-1985,
supra note 16, at 7. Due to this lack of symmetry in information, the impartiality of
Americas Watch was questioned.
A similar experience occurred when Amnesty International issued its report on Israel
and Syria in 1974. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, REPORT OF AN AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL MISSION TO ISRAEL AND THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREATMENT AND TORTURE, 10-24 OCTOBER 1974 (1975). The Israel-

Syria report received severe criticism both inside and outside the Amnesty International
movement. The report's effort to bracket Israel and Syria demonstrated the risks of seeking to establish balance by placing violations of two countries in one report. Those who
politically favored Israel noted that the Israeli violations were much less serious than the
Syrian violations and they resented, therefore, the discussion of Israel in the same report.
It is doubtful that the report served to ameliorate human rights conditions in the area.
Indeed, the report may have had the unanticipated effect for some partisans of justifying
the brutality of one side by reference to the brutality of the other. Although the report
fully indicates the fact-finding problems the mission encountered, the report was criticized for its methodology and, perhaps correctly, for its decision to make findings of fact
on the basis of the flawed evidentiary base available.
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rights abuses in the hope of enlisting widespread pressure on the violating country, while possibly embarrassing the country into ending its violations. Finally, human rights organizations and their membership may
place pressure on outside governments to induce the violating country to
stop abusing human rights.
Human rights organizations may still use these approaches in periods
of armed conflict. These approaches may be less effective at these times,
however, for a number of reasons. A government may ignore the private
approach or give it less weight if the country is more concerned about
fighting a war. This difficulty is particularly great in situations involving
an internal conflict or war of liberation. Human rights groups may only
be able to monitor abuses by one party to the conflict, usually the government. Unfortunately, governments will be particularly sensitive to
questions of a balanced approach and impartiality at these times, and
they will be less receptive to private appeals.
Publication of information on human rights abuses may also backfire
in times of armed conflict. Although publicity will often help to mobilize
pressure on a government to stop abuses of human rights, during times
of armed conflict it can become a two-edged sword. One party to a controversy may use the other party's publicity about human rights violations to justify its own abuses. This difficulty does not occur in times of
peace, when authorities are responsible for violations of human rights
and must answer for them.
Approaches by members of human rights groups to their own governments may also be less effective during times of armed conflict. Sovereign
states may be less willing to interfere with government decisions when
the country is at war. Human rights groups should be aware of these
problems that are inherent when they apply traditional approaches to
armed conflict situations. Human rights groups may have to alter their
traditional operations in order to prevent human rights abuses effectively
at these times.
C. Assisting Victims in Domestic and InternationalTribunals
Human rights organizations have invoked the assistance of international and judicial bodies in attempting to aid victims of human rights
violations during periods of armed conflict. For example, Disabled Peoples' International (DPI) filed a complaint with the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States
on behalf of residents of the Richmond Hill Insane Asylum who were
killed or injured by the United States bombardment during the 1983
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conflict in Grenada."' The complaint alleged violations of articles 1 and
11 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
(American Declaration) 6e 5 and the fourth Geneva Convention." 6 DPI
argued that the right to life was nonderogable in time of war and that,
because there were no domestic remedies to exhaust, the Inter-American
Commission had jurisdiction. The Inter-American Commission accepted
the petition as admissible and found at least a prima facie violation of
the American Declaration's protection for the right to life.' 6 7 Although
the Commission has not yet heard the case on the merits, it must eventually decide whether the American Declaration prohibits killings during
periods of armed conflict-particularly killings that humanitarian law
might also forbid.' 8
In domestic courts human rights groups have argued as amicus curiae
in a number of areas. Human rights advocates have invoked international human rights law and humanitarian law in many cases.' 69 For
example, some have argued that the United States has an obligation to
ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions by granting temporary refuge
to Salvadorans fleeing the killing of civilians in the armed conflict ravaging El Salvador. 7 0

DPI v. U.S., supra note 7.
165. "Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person." OAS Res. XXX, adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States (Mar. 30-May 2, 1948), Bogota, OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/1.4 Rev. (1965),
art. 1. "Every person has the right to the preservation of his health through sanitary and
social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and medical care, to the extent permitted by public and community resources." Id. art. 11.
166. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 1.
167. DPI v. U.S., supra note 7, at 13.
168. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights relies generally on the provisions of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and the American
Convention on Human Rights for its operative human rights standards, but the InterAmerican Commission has found violations of common article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. See, e.g., Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation
of Human Rights in the Republic of Guatemala, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.61, Doc.
47 rev. 1, at 69-70 (1983).
169. See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curiae, Human Rights Advocates, in Support of
Plaintiffs-Appellants at 10-11, Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan,
755 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1985) (citing provisions of Protocol I).
170. See, e.g., In the Matter of Jesus del Carmea Medina, before the U.S. Dept. of
Justice, Board of Immigration Appeals, No. A26 949 415 (slip op.) (1985); cf., e.g.,
Paust, After My Lai: The Case for War CrimesJurisdictionOver Civilians in Federal
District Courts, 50 TEX. L. REV. 6 (1971).
164.

1988]

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

VIII.
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CONCLUSION

International organizations, aside from the International Committee of
the Red Cross, play an important role in assessing whether governments
and armed opposition groups respect their human rights and humanitarian law obligations. Americas Watch, Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists, the United Nations General Assembly,
and other organizations have for some time been using humanitarian law
and human rights law in armed conflict situations. These organizations
need to become more consistent and careful in using humanitarian law;
they can also learn from the experience of the ICRC in how to be more
effective in safeguarding human rights during periods of armed conflict.

